

June 1956

3.45 p.m.

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c/o THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
 2210 - E - STREET. N.W.
 WASHINGTON.D.C.

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Dear [redacted]

Out of today's news papers I cut out the two attached clippings. If I had been Tito I had never used the word "never." It looks too much after the 1000 year Reich.

On the other hand Tito could use these words because the not Red nations have never been capable of refuting the basis of the Red theories.

The Book Review is enlightening because it has been made by an " expert." On Politics.

However in the sentence I underlined he comes into the world of exact applied science. What means there " remaining vigorously dynamic."?

That we must not disarm can be understood by even a small boy. In order to keep up a \$ 35000.000.000 per year program we rather have to do at least something in the vigorous way.

What I miss however in the review of Mr. Robert's book is that all armaments are not capable to destroy the most powerful weapon in the Russian hands, the basis on which communism is founded.

With all respect for President Eisenhouer's good intentions, going through the ~~list~~ list of the 34 chosen experts to propagate our American ideals abroad, must it not appear to the people on the other side of the Atlantic, that all these experts most interested NOT to have communism have not been capable of checking it.

I am neither a scientist or a politician and therefore may not be able to grasp the real situation. The only thing what I can do is to observe that after all these years and the many millions spent on Tito he goes to Moscow and tells them there that they will never split again. Did he learn something ~~from~~ Mr. Nasser ?

In the same New York Times you could read that our scientists have been 12 days and mingled with the best Russian scientists on a quite free basis. And came back quite impressed. From Moscow, that is. Or the Russian Government is still quite sure that we pursue our old course and miss the only invitation Marx put forward at the end of the preface of the first edition of Das Kapital.

Respectfully yours,

B.G.H. Vander Jagt.

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RUSSIA AND AMERICA: Dangers and Prospects. By Henry L. Roberts. Foreword by John J. McCloy. Published for the Council on Foreign Relations. 251 pp. New York: Harper & Bros. \$3.50.

By WARREN B. WALSH

THE genesis of this excellent book was a select study group, sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations, supported by the Ford Foundation and chaired by John J. McCloy. Henry L. Roberts, the director of Columbia's Russian Institute, served as the director of research staff and was entrusted, in Mr. McCloy's words, with "the difficult task of exploring and developing the implications of what was said and drawing systematic conclusions from the discussions." "Russia and America," however, is more than a report of the group's work, though it is based upon their discussions. The book, as its author explains in a note, is the outcome of his own reflections and represents a consensus of opinions but not a collective judgment.


Mr. Roberts organized the material in three parts: "The Nature of the Problem," "American Policy Requirements" and "Areas of Conflict." Judging the nature of the problem to be largely but not exclusively determined by Communist totalitarianism and the existence of fission-fusion weapons, the author briefly explores these basic facts of life with which we must live and under whose shadow we must work out our problems. He then examines the strength and weaknesses of the United States and the Soviet Union. Both, he finds, are "very strong and very vulnerable and promise to become increasingly strong and increasingly vulnerable." The advantage he judges currently to be ours by a slight margin, but he warns that we can retain this favorable position only by remaining vigorously dynamic.

Part Two first outlines the minimum requirements of our policy and then considers in more detail four selected policies. Our first and vital policy aim, Mr. Roberts believes, must be to "prevent the world-wide establishment of Soviet communism, even at the cost of general war." But a general war is unacceptable except under the direst necessity. Our great task is to devise and implement policies that will neither lead to general war nor to the establishment of world-wide communism.

WE must check any further expansion of the Communist bloc while at the same time "maintaining our ability to negotiate, to communicate, to propose." This means, for one thing, that we must maintain a strong military posture without closing the door to arms con-

troil. The author's warning that "the key to any significant and safe reduction in arms may be found only in a real change in the aims of Soviet communism" should be underscored and pondered. It is not, as Mr. Roberts very forcefully and properly points out, merely mutual suspicion that divides us from the Soviets; it is the Communists' "deeply rooted, hostile intent."

In discussing possible policies toward allies and neutrals and of possible economic and social policies, the author carefully points out that no policy and no action can ever be wholly without cost nor can it ever produce exclusively favorable results. There are risks in promoting the economic growth and social development of "underdeveloped countries." Economic expan-



sion in such countries will almost certainly lead to social and psychological dislocations that the Communists can exploit.

Trade restrictions aimed at the Soviet bloc may inflict losses upon our friends and associates as well as upon those against whom they were aimed. We may feel strongly that nations accepting our aid should also accept commitments to the free world, but we should also realize that to make aid depend upon commitments may defeat our real purpose. A neutral or uncommitted nation is, after all, preferable to one committed to the other side.

Part Three deals first with the problem of positive objectives in our relations with the U. S. S. R., and then considers, in turn, Germany, the European satellites and Communist China. In each case, alternative policies or "perspectives" are considered and weighed, and in each case Mr. Roberts states his recommendations cogently but not dogmatically. The final chapter summarizes the general discussion and presents a policy program.

There will not be universal agreement with these policy recommendations nor with all other points presented in this study. One might, for example, question the assumption that a basic division exists between the Soviet peoples and their rulers so that we may seek "normally friendly relations with the Russian people as an outcome of a change in the Soviet outlook or a change in the regime." No one, however, can rightfully question the care, the integrity and the sense of responsibility with which the study group and Mr. Roberts carried out their assignment.

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Tito Says Red Nations Will Never Split Again

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